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The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") hereby
submits its Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
ARGUMENT
I.

Doncouse's Brief Fails to Conform to the Requirements of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure
Doncouse's Brief does not conform with the basic requirements of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and applicable case law interpreting those
rules.1 The rules provide that "References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11 (b) . . . ." Rule 24(b), Utah R.
App. Pro. They also provide that a briefs argument section "shall contain" the
"parts of the record relied on." Rule 24(a)(9), Utah. R. App. Pro.; see also
Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ("This
Court need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or
supported by, the record."). Doncouse's brief has no references to the record.
Moreover, Doncouse's brief sets forth numerous factual contentions for
which there is no support at all in the trial record. Examples of this include most
of Doncouse's statements about his personal circumstances, the advice he
allegedly received concerning his physical and mental condition, the progressive
nature of his health problems, and so on. See e.g. Doncouse's Brief at 2, ^[3; at
3 H6. Although Doncouse's testimony touched briefly upon matters such as his
difficulties in practice in 1999—well before the conduct in issue in the contempt
1

Doncouse also failed to serve the OPC two copies of his brief, as required by
Rule 26; nor was the brief he served bound or printed on both sides of the paper.
See Rule 26(b), Utah R. App. Pro; Rule 27(c), Utah R. App. Pro.
-i

proceedings that underly this appeal—there was no testimony or other evidence
presented about his current medical and psychological diagnoses and what
bearing, if any, these had upon his misconduct. (R. 146-161) During closing
argument, Doncouse merely stated that some of his alleged conditions may have
had something to do with his contempt of court in a couple of instances, but not
all of them. (R. 201-205)
Additionally, many of Doncouse's unsupported statements of fact are
irrelevant to these proceedings, particularly those concerning the period before
his initial discipline. See e.g. Doncouse's Brief at 2,1(2.
Doncouse's brief is likewise devoid of legal analysis with appropriate
citations to authorities, which are also required. See Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App.
Pro.; State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1998) ("A brief must contain
some support for each contention.").
II.

Doncouse's Arguments Are Predicated Upon a Mistaken
Characterization of the Facts and an Incorrect View of the Purpose of
Disciplinary Proceedings
In section I of his Argument, Doncouse agrees that a more severe penalty

than the original suspension he received is called for, but states that the
questions he raised about his physical health and mental state "were a proper
factor for consideration in applying] sanctions under Rule 3.1(b) and therein
evidence pertinent to the court's exercise of applying mitigating factors in the
case at bar." Doncouse's Brief at 14-15.
The District Court did not, however, employ as a mitigating factor
Doncouse's impairment. Indeed, the District Court explicitly rejected it, finding
that "Impairment was not a mitigating factor because although there was
2

testimony concerning some of Doncouse's medical conditions, these do not
appear to be causally related in any way to the violations." (R. 206) Moreover,
Doncouse himself stated during closing argument, "I do not believe that these
things mitigate what had been mitigated to the point of excuse." (R. 198) The
District Court noted that everyone has problems, and invited Doncouse to
demonstrate that there was a causal relationship between his difficulties and his
contempt. (R. 201) Doncouse merely stated that depressive disorders affect
memory loss, and that he stopped practicing some years before because of bipolar disorder, but this had no bearing on his conduct at the prison. (R. 201-203)
This did not arise to the level of mental or physical problems that mitigate
contempt of court, and the District Court correctly declined to view them as such.
In section II of his Argument, Doncouse contends that a one-year
suspension is the appropriate discipline for his misconduct.

See Doncouse's

Brief at 15. In lieu of citing any supporting authority for this, Doncouse merely
states that this is the amount of time he needs to evaluate his situation. He adds,
"the sanction itself judiciously meets the requirements of justice in meting out
punishment for acts outside the standards set for those empowered with the
responsibility of serving the public in the capacity of a licensed attorney in the
State of Utah." Id.
The purpose of lawyer sanctions is not, however, to punish attorneys, nor
is a suspension or disbarment imposed for the purpose of an attorney's reflective
self-assessment of his or her continued will or capacity to resume practice.
Instead, lawyer disciplinary proceedings are "to ensure and maintain the high

standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the discharge
of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public and the
administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that
they

are

unable

or

unlikely

to

properly

discharge

their

professional

responsibilities." Rule 1(a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. ("RLDD");
see also Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards").
Conclusion
The discipline system employs increasingly serious sanctions as a means
of ensuring and maintaining the high standard of professional conduct expected
of attorneys.

Doncouse was suspended for professional misconduct, but

continued to practice law, and filed a sworn statement that falsely assured the
District Court of his compliance with the order of suspension.

Under these

circumstances, disbarment appears to be the next step in furtherance of
protecting the public and the administration of justice. The OPC therefore urges
the Court to reverse the decision of the District Court, and to remand the case for
entry of an order of disbarment.
DATED: August
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